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Accident causation investigation and even more hazard scenario identification are troubled by the 
complexity of interactions between three elements in a process facility: People, Plant and 
Procedures. Interactions are of various nature, such as physical change and information transfer, 
all influencing the process. 
To facilitate investigation the digraph network was applied as the most flexible visual aid to 
describe a causal structure. Such structure consists of nodes and edges representing an event or 
condition in the accident scenario and a causal link respectively. Attributing the nodes and edges 
to the type of interaction, numbers of the same type can be counted, and so two metrics are 
developed:  
 The P3 Interaction Contribution (PIC). This is the proportion of nodes and edges 
associated with an interaction between People, Plant and Procedures.  
 The Average Edge Weight. This relates to the proportion of events in the scenario that are 
associated with the logical AND gate conjunction from its causes (incident nodes), where 
the event requires more than one simultaneous cause. 
The technique was tried on four CSB accident descriptions. Interesting differences are seen. Also, 
in view of a paper accepted to be published in Safety Science the approach seems quite helpful in 
process hazard analysis. 
1 Introduction 
One of the most useful ways that lessons learned from past accidents can help support future 
sustainable operation is if those lessons are used to enhance an organization’s ability to anticipate 
potential future accidents. Anticipating future accident scenarios ahead of time is what risk 
assessment is traditionally used for. But in the modern world, complexity in socio-technical 
process systems makes risk assessment difficult. This complexity is often linked to unforeseen, or 
difficult-to-identify scenarios which undermines anticipation efforts. Thus, the requirements to 
extract the best set of lessons learned from an accident investigation becomes even more critical, 
to support future risk assessment efforts.  
This work seeks to demonstrate the use of two measures applicable to results of accident 
investigations, namely the accident investigation reports. Four accident reports previously 
generated by the US Chemical Safety Board were analysed. These are listed in Section 2.1. These 
measures are extracted from a causal network representation of the accidents, and are generally 
called network metrics. Network representations for modelling and analysing accident scenarios is 
a well-established practice, such as through the use of Fault Trees [1]. However, the directed graph 
or digraph network applied here allows feedback causation, not possible in Fault trees or Bayesian 
networks. A more recently established practice [2] is to study the topology of accident networks, 
through the extraction of various network metrics from that topology. The metrics applied here 
can be used to support accident investigators to reflect on the analysis they have performed and 
help them clarify whether they have extracted the most helpful or accurate set of lessons learned 
possible.  
The first metric is called the P3 Interaction Contribution (PIC), a recently introduced metric for 
analysing accident in previous work [2]. The PIC is a relative measure of the contribution of so-
called P3 interactions, or interactions between people, plant or procedures, to an accident scenario 
as a whole. This approach of categorizing process system components is well established [3, 4, 5]. 
The PIC can be an indication of how important causal links between fundamentally different 
component types can be to the generation and progression of an accident.  
The second metric is the Average Edge Weight of the causal networks that represent the accident 
scenarios. This corresponds to the number of logical AND gates in the scenario. More edges 
participating in AND gates will show up as a lower overall average edge weight overall in the 
network. This is calculated by summing all the edge weights and dividing by the number of edges 
in the network. This metric is useful because more AND gates implies that more than one cause is 
required for the accident to progress, possibly implying that due to higher complexity it may be 
less likely to reoccur. 
Either through using the PIC or the average edge weight measure, analysts currently investigating 
an accident can be lead to question whether the data they are collecting and the way they are 
writing the report is the most helpful or accurate for representing the accident. In this sense, then, 
using these network metrics alongside tradition accident analysis technique offers a refreshing 
take on generating lessons learned from past accidents, the purpose of which is to generate the best 
set of lessons learned possible to enhance the anticipation of future accidents, and thus the risk 
assessment efforts in an increasingly complex work.  
This refreshing take is demonstrated by first describing a summary of the methodology used to 
generate the causal network diagrams and their metrics, in Section 2. Section 3 displays these 
results, with a short discussion given on them in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions 
drawn and suggests avenues for future work. 
2 Methodology 
This section details the method used to extract and generate the networks from the CSB accident 
reports and calculate the two network metrics: the PIC and average edge weight. 
2.1 Conversion of Accident Reports into weighted causal networks 
The first step was to read the four accident investigation reports from the CSB website 
(www.csb.gov) that detailed the events surrounding the following four accidents: 
 Barton Solvents [6] 
 Valero Propane [7] 
 ASCO [8] 
 AL Solutions [9] 
The text describing the accident events and how they were causally related, was then converted 
into a causal network. Each node of the network represents an event or a condition found in the 
relevant accident report. Figure 1 shows an example of the conversion process, using a section of 
text from the Valero Propane accident. The unique numerical identifiers assigned to each event are 
arbitrary. 
 
Figure 1 - Causal Network Event Extraction from Accident Reports 
Based on the causal relationships extracted from the report, the numbered events were linked 
together. Weights were added to each edge based on whether the cause for a particular event was 
part of an AND gate or an OR gate, or a singular cause. Figure 2 shows how an OR gate is 
configured in the causal network used in this work. 
In this incident, water settling out of a propane stream 
likely leaked through a 10  NPS20 (250 DN) inlet 
block valve and accumulated in the low point formed 
by a control station. The control station was connected 
to the process, but had not been used for 
approximately 15 years. 
13. Water leaked through at 
process pressure and 
accumulated 
3. Use of control valve 
discontinued
4. Subsection left connected 
to process under high 
pressure 
2. Makeup propane contains 
variable amount of 
entrained water
7. Control station not 





Figure 2 - OR gate configuration in a causal network 
The events that comprise the list of causes in an OR gate with each have an edge weight of 1. This 
is to signify that they can each cause the latter event independently. If an event has only one cause, 
then the edge weight will likewise be 1.  










Figure 3 - AND gate configuration in causal network 
The events that comprise the list of causes in an AND gate will have edge weights that sum to 1. 
Thus, a two-event AND gate will have two edge worth 0.5 each, and a three-event AND gate will 
have three edges worth 0.33 each (approximately 1). 
2.2 Generating Network Diagrams 
Once the weighted networks have been constructed as per the approach in Section 2.1, an 
adjacency matrix is constructed [5]. This matrix is a mathematical representation of the causal 
relationships between the events in a causal network. Figure 4 shows an example of how the 











Node ID Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Event 1 0 0 1
Event 2 0 0 1
Event 3 0 0 0
Node ID Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Event 1 0 0 0.5
Event 2 0 0 0.5
Event 3 0 0 0
Node ID Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4
Event 1 0 0 0.33 0
Event 2 0 0 0.33 0
Event 3 0 0 0 0
Event 4 0 0 0.33 0
 
Figure 4 - Adjacency Matrices of Example Networks 
These matrices are captured in MS Excel and are then imported into Matlab for network 
visualisation. Following the method detailed above, the causal networks that represent the four 
accident reports were generated and presented in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
2.3 Causal Network Metrics 
The two network metrics applied to the accident networks in this work, as discussed in Section 1, 
are the P3 Interaction Contribution (PIC) and the Sum of Incoming Edges/Number of Edges.  
2.3.1 P3 Interaction Contribution (PIC) 
In previous work [2], the PIC metric was first introduced, with a summary included here. The PIC 
is a relative measure of the contribution of P3 interactions to an accident scenario as a whole. A 
P3 Interaction is counted as an association or a causal interaction between two different component 
types, from the following three categories: People, Plant and Procedures. P3 interactions can be 
found within an event description in a node, or between two different nodes, represented by an 
edge. There are four categories of P3 interaction: people-plant, people-procedure, plant-procedure 
and people-plant-procedure. The total number of P3 interactions were counted for each accident 
network and divided by the sum of the number of nodes (N) and edges (E) for that network, 
according to Equation 1. 
Equation 1 - PIC Calculation 
𝑃𝐼𝐶 =  
𝑃3 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 +  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠
 
 
2.3.2 Average Edge Weight 
The average edge weight for a causal network will indicate the proportion of causal links that 
participate in AND gates. A higher number of AND gates in a particular accident scenario may 
indicate that the likelihood of that scenario to be lower than an accident with more AND gates. 
This is simply because more simultaneous events or conditions needed to occur for that accident 
to progress. The average edge weight is calculated according to Equation 2. 
 
Equation 2 - Average Edge Weight 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐸𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 =  





This section contains the results of the analysis. Firstly, event lists for each accident are contained 
in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4. The weight causal network for each accident is presented 
in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8. The P3 Interaction count for each network, with the 
distribution of all the types of interactions between components, is shown in Table 5 with a 
corresponding plot for the P3 interactions count for each accident shown in Figure 9. Table 6 
contains a summary of the network metrics for each accident.  
Table 1 - Events in Barton Solvents Accident Scenario 
Node ID Node Description 
1 Three compartment tanker arrived to fill storage tank 
2 Tank contained ignitable vapour-air mix in head space  
3 No precautions in place to stop ignitable vapour-air mix in headspace  
4 MSDS did not indicate that vapour-air mix could form within tank 
5 MSDS did not list precautionary measures beyond normal grounding and bonding 
6 
Barton pumped naphtha from three separate compartments to tank, requiring pipe to be removed and 
position on tanker changed 
7 Air pockets introduced to fill piping when compartments changed  
8 Stop-start filling of naphtha tank accumulating static  
9 No manway or access to facilitate cleaning 
10 No records of tank ever being cleaned 
11 Employees scooped sediment from similar tanks 
12 Likelihood of presence of sediment and water in naphtha tank  
13 Liquid gauging system float has loose linkage at tape/float junction 
14 Turbulence and bubbling from stop/start pumping and air ingress  
15 Rapid static charge accumulation  
16 Slack in gauge tape created  
17 Linkage separated  
18 Non-conductive liquid static prevention precautions not in place  
19 Tank filled to point of maximum expected surface voltage  
20 Spark occurred  
21 Spark ignited vapour-air mix  
22 Naphtha tank exploded  
23 Tank flew into the air and landed 130 feet away  
24 Two more tanks ruptured and released their contents into the fire  
25 Intense fire caused contents of other tanks to over-pressurize and ignite  









Table 2 - Events in Valero Propane Accident Scenario 
Node ID Node Description 
1 Below freezing weather in morning 
2 Makeup propane contains variable amount of entrained water 
3 Use of control valve discontinued 
4 Subsection left connected to process under high pressure  
5 Block valves around control valve closed but subsection was not isolated with slip blinds   
6 
No formal process safety / change of management review conducted when control station removed 
from active service  
7 Control station not isolated forming dead leg  
8 
American petroleum institute doesn't provide detailed guidance on freeze protection programs or 
sufficiently stress freeze protection of dead-legs 
9 
Freeze protection practices did not ensure process units systematically reviewed to identify and 
mitigate freezing hazards for dead legs  
10 Control station not freeze-protected  
11 Foreign object jammed block valve  
12 Leak path created  
13 Water leaked through at process pressure and accumulated  
14 Water froze within pipe and expanded  
15 Pipe elbow fractured  along inner elbow  
16 Air temperature rose  
17 Highly pressurized propane released from fracture, since the ice sealing the fracture melted 
18 High and shifting winds 
19 Propane travelled downwind to boiler house or nearby fired heaters  
20 Propane ignited and flashed back to leak source  
21 Fire impinged on piping around No. 1 Extractor releasing additional propane  
22 Rapidly expanding fire prevented access to manual isolation valves or local pump controls  
23 
API safety guidance does not address ROSOV use in process units handling large quantities of 
flammable materials 
24 Valero closed ROSOV installation action item without verification 
25 No remotely operable shut-off valves installed in PDA  
26 Propane was unable to be isolated  
27 
API and Valero standards do not provide sufficient fireproofing guidance for pipe racks near high-
pressure flammable units 
28 Structural support was not fireproofed 
29 Support column was impacted by high-pressure propane jet  
30 Pipe rack collapsed  
31 Multiple pipes failed discharging liquid petroleum products  
32 Fire size/intensity rose significantly  
33 Surrounding equipment damaged  
34 Rapid spread of fire  
35 Chlorine used as a biocide in adjacent cooling tower 
36 PHA for system doesn't examine hazards of locating chlorine containers close to PDA unit 
37 Three one-ton chlorine containers exposed to radiant heating from fire  
38 All three containers vented varying amounts of chlorine when fusible plugs melted  
39 2.5 tons of chlorine released 
40 Butane storage sphere exposed to radiant heating  
41 
API-recommended practises do not require evaluation of adjacent process hazards in specifying 
location of deluge valves 
42 Manual deluge valve located too close to PDA unit and could not be opened  
43 Wind tended to move flames away from sphere  
44 Near-miss - butane tank impinged with flame but did not fail. Minimal damage to tank 
45 Plant personnel and contractors heard a 'pop' and saw propane cloud blowing from control station  
46 Plant personnel directed workers in the area to evacuate  
47 Fire alarm activated  
48 Emergency response team arrived and approached fire  
49 Winds hampered stationary fire water monitors  
50 Operators noticed deteriorating situation  
51 Evacuation ordered 15 minutes after ignition began  
52 Main feeds and fuel gas supply isolated by emergency services  
53 Chlorine and sulphuric acid leaks made entry too hazardous  
54 Fire extinguished 52 hours after ignition  
55 4 workers injured, 3 suffering serious burns  
56 10 Valero employees and contractors treated for minor injuries 
57 Total shutdown of McKee Refinery for two months  
58 Refinery operated at reduced capacity for nearly a year  
59 $50 million in direct losses due to fire  
60 Significant quantities of gasoline lost in fire  










Table 3 - Events in ASCO Accident Scenario 
Node ID Node Description 
1 Workers shovelling snow south of shed where acetylene accumulated 
2 Operator's manual did not address recycle water system 
3 
Operators had no written guidance on operation of recycle system or consequences on deviation from 
intended sequence 
4 
General procedures posted in generator room lacked guidance on appropriate sequence for adding 
water to the generator 
5 Workers did not operate process consistently due to inadequate staff training / documentation 
6 Generator was pressurized with acetylene gas before recycle water supply was established 
7 City water supply valve closed prior to starting recycled water system 
8 No source of pressurized water to prevent reverse flow of acetylene 
9 1996 PHA didn't identify hazards created by decant water line drain in shed 
10 Check valve in recycle water line did not use springs or guides to assist seating of plug 
11 Plug is prone to misalignment 
12 Check valve internals are prone to solid build-up such as scale 
13 Check valve guide pin "hung up" on lower pipe nipple 
14 Recycled Water "Found Closed" valve either open or leaked significantly in closed position 
15 Acetylene was able to flow back through recycle water line 
16 Acetylene leaked from the generator through to the shed through water recycle line 
17 Heavy snowfall 
18 Freeze Protection Practices in place: Decanted water line normally left open to protect from freezing 
19 Lime shed had no ventilation 
20 Shed contained a propane heater with a hot surface 
21 Acetylene gas accumulated in lime shed through drain leak 
22 Acetylene gas ignited upon contact with heater surface 
23 Three workers were killed 
24 One worker was seriously injured by the blast 
25 Lime shed completely destroyed 
26 Debris hurled up to 450 feet from the site 
27 Two large holes were blown into the sides of adjacent building 
28 Windows were shattered 
29 Doors blown into building / knocked off their hinges/rails 
30 PHA was not updated in 2001 as required 




Figure 7 - ASCO Causal Network 
 
Table 4 - Events in AL Solutions Accident Scenario 
Node ID Node Description 
1 Weak safety management for handling titanium and zirconium safe storage and handling 
2 Faulty blender identified 
3 Insufficient temporary fix used 
4 Metal blades continued scraping on metal casing 
5 Spark occurred 
6 Ignition of zirconium dust 
7 Explosion 
8 Lids not closed on equipment 
9 Fire became airborne 
10 Did not follow dust reduction recommendations or collection system, as recommended by standards 
11 Mix of zirconium and titanium being milled (ground in to fine powders) 
12 OSHA did not implement any combustible dust standard 
13 Collection of dust on equipment 
14 Fire spread 
15 Water used for wash-down procedures 
16 Hydrogen gas present in facility 
17 Hydrogen gas caught fire 
18 Barrels not in use left in production room instead of secondary storage facility  
19 Barrels caught fire 
20 Increased fire intensity 
21 Operators at blender and presses died 
22 Water deluge system activated 
23 
Insurance auditors commended facility and declared potential dust incidents are effectively controlled, 
not recommending a process hazards analysis. 
24 Insurance auditors declared fire protection systems good process control 
25 Damage caused throughout production area 
26 Permanent shutdown 
27 Electrical contractor received severe injuries 
28 Electrical contractor in hydraulic room for maintenance 
29 Management did not enforce lid closure on blender during operation 
30 Housekeeping approach to dust control 
 
 
Figure 8 - AL Solutions Causal Network 
 

































B A R T O N  S O L V E N T S V A L E R O  P R O P A N E A S C O A L  S O L U T I O N S
P3 INTERACTION TYPE FOR ACCIDENT 
SCENARIOS
People-Plant People-Procedure Plant-Procedure People-Plant-Procedure
Type of P3 
Interaction 






































































People 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Plant 11 0 11 27 0 27 13 0 13 13 0 13 
Procedure 1 0 1 6 0 6 3 0 3 1 0 1 
People-People 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Plant-Plant 6 20 26 12 43 55 7 19 26 3 19 22 
Procedure-
Procedure 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
People-Plant 4 6 10 10 20 30 3 5 8 8 9 17 
People-
Procedure 
0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 
Plant-
Procedure 
3 4 7 0 4 4 0 0 0 3 2 5 
People-Plant-
Procedure 
1 1 2 1 5 6 1 8 9 2 11 13 
P3 Count 8 11 19 12 29 41 6 14 20 13 22 35 
 





ASCO AL Solutions 
Number of Nodes (N) 26 61 31 30 
Number of Edges (E) 31 73 34 41 
Sum of Edge Weights 25 49 22 29 
Average Edge Weight 0.81 0.67 0.65 0.66 
P3 Count 19 41 20 35 
PIC 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.49 
 
4 Discussion 
Initial inspection of the networks in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 reveals that they 
both have similarities and differences. Barton and ASCO have a series of initiating causes, 
focussing in on a few central events, which happen to be nodes 21 and 22 in both networks. AL 
Solutions and Valero have a more complex structure, and yet visual inspection reveals that they 
appear to be quite different from each other. In terms of the number of nodes and edges, Barton 
(26 N – 31 E), ASCO (31 N – 34 E) and AL Solutions (30 N – 41 E) are all similar sizes, shown 
in Table 6. Valero Propane is considerably bigger (61 N – 73 E). Thus, as is expected, Valero has 
the highest P3 count, but this is simply because it is a larger network. The PIC for Barton (0.33), 
Valero (0.31) and ASCO (0.31) are all similar, with AL solutions (0.49) having the largest. And 
yet the contribution of different types of P3 interactions for each scenario differs, as shown in 
Figure 9. Barton has the high average edge weight (0.81), where Valero (0.67), ASCO (0.65) and 
AL Solutions (0.66) are very similar.  
A lower average edge weight indicates that Valero, ASCO and AL Solutions would potentially 
harder to identify ahead of time than Barton, during risk assessment, since more simultaneous 
events or conditions need to be in place for them to progress. Conversely, an accident with a high 
average edge weight may tend to be easier to identify but harder to stop, since on average there 
are more independent paths along which the accident can progress. This is the situation where 
there are more independent causes per node and/or more OR gates.  
Thus, once the average edge weight useful questions that investigators could ask themselves could 
be: 
 Did I expect that degree of AND gates in the scenario? 
 If my average edge weight is very high, is the causal progression really that simple? Could 
there actually be other conditions hidden that I just haven’t found yet, that contribute to 
the accident? 
 If the average edge weight is very low, does that really mean this situation will be hard to 
identify in the future? If so, what can we embed in the lessons learned about new 
monitoring practices that could be implemented? Have we considered monitoring 
practices at all? 
These kind of questions could push them to look further into the scenario until they are thoroughly 
satisfied that they have captured it accurately.  
Similarly, the PIC for each scenario could help investigators ask the following kinds of questions: 
 For ASCO, does the P3 interaction type distribution in Figure 9, suggest that perhaps the 
lessons learned should include recommendations that combine people-plant-procedure 
interactions, and people-plant interactions, in roughly equal measure? 
 Since the PIC is almost 0.5 for AL Solutions, does that mean that the lessons learned should 
be related to P3 interactions at least half the time?  
 For Valero Propane, does the lower PIC mean that P3 interactions are not that significant 
for the scenario as a whole? And does the high proportion of P3 interactions that a People-
plant (Figure 9), and the high proportion of plant and plant-plant interactions in Table 5, 
mean that we don’t have to strongly consider the impact of procedures at all? 
The above hypothetical questions demonstrate that metrics like the PIC and the average edge 
weight, used during accident investigations, could be effective reflective practice tools to enhance 
the results. Using the metrics to form a series of checking questions, for example, could remove 
threats of complacency in the analyst’s practice. One of the benefits of metrics based on topology 
of causal networks is that they are generic tools that can be used flexibly in many different 
circumstances to support accident investigation. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper demonstrated the use of two causal network metrics applied to accidents previously 
investigation by the CSB. Then, intention was to show how the PIC and the average edge weight 
could be used to support reflective practice activities during the investigation activities themselves, 
with the goal of generating the best set of lessons learned possible.  
Further explorations with the PIC and the average edge weight would be to calculate them for 
many accident reports that the CSB has produced, and see if there is a correlation, such as if a high 
PIC corresponds with a lower average edge weight, meaning more AND gates in the scenario. If 
so, then more P3 interactions would indicate that an accident scenario is harder to identify, but 
easier to arrest. Thus, the two metrics may be more deeply related than first thought. 
We hope this paper is a refreshing take on the activity of accident investigation, spurring a renewed 
interest in how accident reports are written and investigations carried out, to maximise the benefits 
of them for identifying causal structures potentially leading to mishap and so enhancing risk 
assessment in a complex world.  
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